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Abstract—Remote Attestation (RA) allows a trusted entity
(verifier) to securely measure internal state of a remote untrusted
hardware platform (prover). RA can be used to establish a static
or dynamic root of trust in embedded and cyber-physical systems.
It can also be used as a building block for other security services
and primitives, such as software updates and patches, verifiable
deletion and memory resetting. There are three major classes
of RA designs: hardware-based, software-based, and hybrid, each
with its own set of benefits and drawbacks.
This paper presents the first hybrid RA design – called HYDRA
– that builds upon formally verified software components that
ensure memory isolation and protection, as well as enforce access
control to memory and other resources. HYDRA obtains these
properties by using the formally verified seL4 microkernel.
(Until now, this was only attainable with purely hardware-based
designs.) Using seL4 requires fewer hardware modifications to
the underlying microprocessor. Building upon a formally verified
software component increases confidence in security of the
overall design of HYDRA and its implementation. We instantiate
HYDRA on two commodity hardware platforms and assess the
performance and overhead of performing RA on such platforms
via experimentation; we show that HYDRA can attest 10MB of
memory in less than 500msec when using a Speck-based message
authentication code (MAC) to compute a cryptographic checksum
over the memory to be attested.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, embedded systems (ES), cyber-physical
systems (CPS) and internet-of-things (IoT) devices, have per-
colated into many aspects of daily life, such as: households,
offices, buildings, factories and vehicles. This trend of “smart-
ification” of everything that was previously analog (or at least
not connected) brings many obvious benefits. However, it also
expands the attack surface and turns these newly computerized
gadgets into natural and attractive targets.
Remote Attestation (RA) is the process whereby a trusted
entity called “verifier” securely probes internal state of a
remote and untrusted hardware platform, called “prover.” RA
can be used to establish a static or dynamic root of trust in ES,
CPS and IoT devices. Also, RA can be used as a foundation for
constructing more specialized security services, e.g., software
updates, verifiable deletion and memory resetting. There are
three main classes of RA designs: hardware-based, software-
based, and hybrid (blending hardware and software). Each
class has its own advantages and limitations. This paper
*Currently at the Computer Science Laboratory, SRI International.
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introduces the first hybrid RA design – called HYDRA –
based upon formally verified components to provide memory
isolation and protection guarantees. Our main rationale is
that designing RA techniques based upon such components
increases confidence in security of such designs and their
implementations. Of course, ideally, one would formally prove
security of the entirety of an RA system, as opposed to proving
security separately for each component and then proving that
its composition is secure. However, we believe that this is not
yet possible given the state-of-the-art in (automated) formal
verification and synthesis of hardware and software.
One recent prominent example illustrating difficulty of cor-
rectly designing and implementing security primitives (espe-
cially, those blending software and hardware) is the TrustZone-
based Qualcomm Secure Execution Environment (QSEE) ker-
nel vulnerability and exploit reported in CVE-2015-6639 [19].
ARM TrustZone [4] is a popular System-on-Chip (SoC) and
a CPU system-wide approach to security, it is adopted in
billions of processors on various platforms. CVE-2015-6639
enables privilege escalation and allows execution of code in the
TrustZone kernel which can then be used to achieve undesired
outcomes and expose keying material. This vulnerability was
used to break Android’s Full Disk Encryption (FDE) scheme
by recovering the master keys [1]. Our intention with this
example is to demonstrate difficulty of getting both the design
and the implementation right, as well as a motivation to use
formally verified building blocks, which (we hope) will yield
more secure RA techniques. To this end, our RA design uses
the formally verified seL4 microkernel to obtain memory iso-
lation and access control. Such features have been previously
attained with hardware in designs such as [7] and [14]. Using
seL4 requires fewer hardware modifications to the underlying
microprocessor and provides an automated formal proof of
isolation guarantees of the implementation of the microkernel.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to design
and implement RA using a formally verified microkernel.
The main goal of this paper is to investigate a previ-
ously unexplored segment of the design space of hybrid RA
schemes, specifically, techniques that incorporate formally
verified and proven (using automated methods) components,
such as the seL4 microkernel. Beyond using seL4 in our
design, our implementation is also based on the formally
verified executable of seL4; that executable is guaranteed to
adhere to the formally verified and proven design. Another
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important goal, motivation and feature of our design is the
expanded scope of efficient hybrid RA techniques. While ap-
plicability of prominent prior results (particularly, SMART [7]
and TrustLite [14]) is limited to very simple single-process
low-end devices, we target more capable devices that can
run multiple processes and threads. We believe that this
paper represents an important and necessary step towards
building efficient hybrid RA techniques upon solid and verified
foundations. Admittedly, we do not verify our entire design
and prove its security using formal methods. However, we
achieve the next best thing by taking advantage of already-
verified components and carefully arguing security of the
overall design, considering results on systematic analysis of
features required for securely realizing hybrid RA [8]. To
achieve our goals we make two main contributions: (1) design
of HYDRA – the first hybrid RA technique based on the
formally verified seL4 microkernel which provides memory
isolation and access control guarantees, (2) implementations of
HYDRA on two commercially available development boards
(Sabre Lite and ODROID-XU4) and their extensive analysis
via experiments to demonstrate practicality of the proposed
design. We show that HYDRA can attest 10MB of memory
in less than 500ms when using Speck [20] as the underlying
block-cipher to compute a cryptographic checksum over the
memory to be attested.
Organization: Section II overviews related work, followed
by Section III which presents our goals and assumptions. The
design of HYDRA is presented in Section IV and its security
analysis in Section VI. Implementation issues and performance
assessment are discussed in Sections V and VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Prior work in remote attestation (RA) can be divided into
three approaches: hardware-based, software-based, and hybrid.
a) Hardware-Based Remote Attestation: The hardware-
based approach typically relies on the security provided by a
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [26]. A TPM is a secure co-
processor designed to protect cryptographic keys, and utilize
them to encrypt or digitally sign data. A TPM can also
produce a summary (e.g., hash) of hardware and software
configurations in the system. A typical TPM also contains
Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) that can be used as a
secure storage of such a configuration summary. The values
in PCRs can then be used as an evidence of attestation by
accumulating an unforgeable chain of values of the system’s
state since the last reset. A TPM eventually signs these
values with an attestation key along with a random challenge,
provided by a verifier, and submits the computed result to the
verifier. Gasmi et al. [10] presents how to link this evidence
to secure channel end-points.
b) Software-Based Remote Attestation: Despite resisting
all but physical attacks, the hardware-based approach is not
suitable for embedded devices due to its additional software
complexity and expense. Therefore, many software-only RA
approaches have been proposed, specifically for embedded
devices. Pioneer [22] is among the first to study RA with-
out relying on any secure co-processor or CPU-architecture
extensions. The main idea behind Pioneer is to create a
special checksum function with run-time side-effects (e.g.,
status registers) for attestation. Any malicious emulation of
said checksum function can be detected through additional
timing overhead incurred from the absence of those side-
effects. Security of this approach became questionable after
several attacks on such schemes (i.e., [6]) were demonstrated.
c) Hybrid Remote Attestation: The main shortcoming
of the software-based approach is that it makes strong as-
sumptions about adversarial capabilities, which may be un-
satisfied in practical networked settings [2]. Thus, several
hybrid software-hardware co-designs have been proposed to
overcome this limitation. SMART [7] presents a hybrid ap-
proach for RA with minimal hardware modifications to ex-
isting MCUs. In addition to having uninterruptable attestation
code and attestation keys resided in ROM, this architecture
utilizes a hard-wired memory protection unit (MPU) to restrict
access to secret keys to only SMART code. The attestation is
performed inside ROM-resident attestation code by computing
a cryptographic checksum over a memory region and returning
the value to the verifier. TrustLite [14] extends [7] to enable
RA while supporting an interrupt handling in a secure place.
In addition to the above work designing RA schemes,
[8] provides a systematic treatment of RA by presenting a
precise definition of the desired service and proceeding to
its systematic deconstruction into necessary and sufficient
(security) properties. These properties are then mapped into
a minimal collection of hardware and software components
that results in secure RA. We build on the analysis in [8] and
utilize these properties and components (which are described
in Section III) and show how to instantiate them in new ways
to develop our new hybrid RA design, HYDRA.
III. GOALS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This section presents an overview of HYDRA and the
rationale behind its design, discusses the common remote
attestation (RA) security objective and features, and the ad-
versary model.
A. Design Rationale
Our main objective is to explore a new segment of the
design space for RA schemes. Our hybrid RA design –
HYDRA – requires very little in terms of secure hardware
and builds upon the formally verified seL4 microkernel. As
shown in Section V, hardware support needed by HYDRA
is readily available on commercial off-the-shelf development
boards and processors, e.g., Sabre Lite and ODROID-XU4
boards. The rationale behind our design is that seL4 offers
certain guarantees (mainly process isolation and access control
to memory and resources) that provide RA features that
were previously feasible only using hardware components. In
particular, what was earlier attained using additional MCU
controls and Read-Only Memory (ROM) in the SMART [7]
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and TrustLite [14] architectures can now be instantiated using
capability controls in seL4.
To motivate and justify the design of HYDRA, we start
from the work by Francillon, et al. [8]. It provides a systematic
treatment of RA by developing a semi-formal definition of RA
as a distinct security service, and systematically deconstructing
it into a necessary and sufficient security objective, from
which specific properties are derived. These properties are
then mapped into a collection of hardware and software
components that results in an overall secure RA design. Below,
we summarize the security objective in RA and its derived
security properties. In Sections IV and V we show how the
security objective and each property are satisfied in HYDRA
design and instantiated in two concrete prototypes based on
the Sabre Lite and ODROID-XU4 boards.
B. Hybrid RA Security Objective and Derived Properties
According to [8], the RA security objective is to allow a
(remote) prover (PRV) to create an unforgeable authentication
token, that convinces a verifier (VRF) that the former is in
some well-defined (expected) state. Whereas, if PRV has been
compromised and its state has been modified, the authentica-
tion token must reflect this. [8] also describes a combination
of platform properties that achieve aforementioned security
objective. The goal of the analysis in [8] is to obtain a set of
properties that are both necessary and sufficient for secure RA.
The security objective is examined and the properties needed
to attain it are identified. The conclusion is that the following
properties collectively represent the minimal and necessary set
to achieve secure RA on any platform.
• Exclusive Access to Attestation Key (K): the attestation
process (PAttest) must be the only one with access to K.
This is the most difficult property to impose on embedded
(especially, low-end and mid-range) devices. As argued in
[8], this property is unachievable without some hardware
support on low-end devices. If the underlying proces-
sor supports multiple privilege modes and a full-blown
separation of memory for each process, one could use a
privileged process to handle all computations that involve
the key. However, low-end and medium-end processors
generally do not offer such “luxury” features.
• No Leaks: no information related to (or derived from)
K must be accessible after the execution of PAttest
completes. To achieve this, all intermediate values that
depend on the key – except the final attestation token to
be returned to VRF – must be securely erased, when
they are no longer needed. This is again applicable to
very low-end devices, with none or minimal Operating
System (OS) support and assuming that memory is shared
between processes. However, if the underlying hardware
and/or software (i.e., OS) guarantees that each process’
memory is inaccessible by any other process, then this
property is trivially satisfied.
• Immutability: To ensure that the attestation executable
(Attest) cannot be modified, SMART [7] and the design
in [8] place it in ROM, which is available on most,
even low-end, platforms. ROM is certainly one relatively
inexpensive way to enforce Attest’s code immutability.
However, owing to seL4’s features, Attest in HYDRA is
resident in, and executed from, RAM.
• Uninterruptability: Execution of Attest must be uninter-
ruptible. This is necessary to ensure that malware does not
obtain the key (or some function thereof) by interrupting
Attest while any key-related values remain in registers or
other accessible locations. As discussed later, HYDRA
achieves this property by assuring that it runs with the
highest possible priority under seL4.
• Controlled Invocation (aka Atomicity): Attest must only
be invocable from its first instruction and must exit only
at one of its legitimate last (exit) instruction. This is
motivated by the need to prevent code-reuse attacks.
[8] has one additional property of Secure Reset when someone
attempts to start the attestation executable (Attest) from the
middle. We argue that a complete secure reset is not needed
if controlled invocation is enforced. All that is needed in that
case is to raise an exception as long as the memory space of
Attest is protected and integrity of executable is guaranteed.
C. Adversarial Model & Other Assumptions
Based on the recent taxonomy in [2], adversaries in the RA
context can be categorized as follows:
• Remote Adversaries: exploit vulnerabilities in a prover’s
software to inject (over the network) malware onto it.
• Local Adversaries: locate sufficiently near in order to
eavesdrop on, and manipulate, the prover’s communica-
tion channel(s).
• Physical Adversaries: have full (local) physical access to
the prover and its hardware and can perform physical at-
tacks, e.g., side-channel attacks to obtain keys, physically
extract memory values, and modify the states of various
hardware components.
Similar to prior hybrid RA designs, HYDRA aims to protect
against remote and local adversaries, while physical adver-
saries are out-of-scope. We note that, at least in a single-
prover setting1, protection against physical attacks can be
attained by encasing the CPU in tamper-resistant coating and
employing standard techniques to prevent side-channel key
leakage. These include: anomaly detection, internal power
regulators and additional metal layers for tamper detection.
We consider PRV to be a (possibly) unattended remote
hardware platform running multiple processes on top of seL4.
Once PRV boots up and runs in steady state, the adversary
(ADV) might exercise complete control over all application
software (including code and data) before and after execution
of PAttest. As physical attacks are out of scope, ADV cannot
induce hardware faults or retrieve a stored K using side
channels. ADV also has no means of interrupting execution of
seL4 or the PAttest code when invoked (how this is ensured
will be demonstrated later). Finally, recall that PRV and VRF
must share at least one secret (attestation) key K. This key can
1See [12] for physical attack resilience in groups or swarms of provers.
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Fig. 1: Sample seL4 instantiation from [23].
be pre-loaded onto PRV at installation time; it is stored as
part of PAttest binaries. We do not address the details of this
procedure.
IV. HYDRA DESIGN
We first overview seL4 and discuss how it can be used
in HYDRA to realize previously identified RA properties. We
then describe the sequence of operations in HYDRA.
A. seL4 Overview
seL4 is a member of the L4 microkernel family, specif-
ically designed for high-assurance applications by providing
isolation and memory protection between different processes.
These properties are mathematically guaranteed by a full-code
level functional correctness proof, using automated tools. A
further correctness proof of the C code translation is presented
in [24], thus extending functional correctness properties to the
binary level without needing a trusted compiler. Therefore,
behavior of the seL4 binary strictly adheres to, and is fully
captured by, the abstract specifications.
Similar to other operating systems, seL4 divides the virtual
memory into two separated address spaces: kernel-space and
user-space. The kernel-space is reserved for the execution of
the seL4 microkernel while the application software is run in
user-space. By design, and adhering to the nature of microker-
nels, the seL4 microkernel provides minimal functionalities to
user-space applications: thread, inter-process communication
(IPC), virtual memory, capability-based access control and
interrupt control. The seL4 microkernel leaves the implemen-
tations of other traditional operating system functions – such
as device drivers and file systems – to user-space.
Figure 1 (borrowed from [23]) shows an example of seL4
instantiation with two threads – sender A and receiver B –
that communicate via an EndPoint EP. Each thread has a
Thread Control Block (TCB) that stores its context, including:
stack pointer, program counter, register values, as well as
pointers to Virtual-address Space (VSpace) and Capability
Space (CSpace). VSpace represents available memory regions
that the seL4 microkernel allocated to each thread. The root
of VSpace represents a Page Directory (PD), which contains
Page Table (PT) objects. Frame object representing a region
of physical memory resides in a PT. Each thread also has its
own kernel managed CSpace used to store a Capability Node
(CNode) and capabilities. CNode is a table of slots, where
each slot represents either a capability or another CNode.
A capability is an unforgeable token representing an access
control authorization of each kernel object or component. A
thread cannot directly access or modify a capability since
CSpace is managed by, and stored inside, the kernel. Instead, a
thread can invoke an operation on a kernel object by providing
a pointer to a capability that has sufficient authority for that
object to the kernel. For example, sender A in Figure 1 needs
a write capability of EP for sending a message, while receiver
B needs a read capability to receive a message. Besides read
and write, grant is another access right in seL4, available only
for an endpoint object. Given possession of a grant capability
for an endpoint, any capability from the possessor can be
transferred across that endpoint. For instance, if A in Figure 1
has grant access to EP, it can issue one of its capabilities, say
a frame, to B via EP. Also, capabilities can be statically issued
during a thread’s initialization by the initial process. The initial
process is the first executable user-space process loaded into
working memory (i.e., RAM) after the seL4 microkernel is
loaded. This special process then forks all other processes.
Section IV-D describes the role, the details and the capabilities
of the initial process in HYDRA design.
seL4’s main “claim to fame” is in being the first formally
verified general-purpose operating system. Formal verification
of the seL4 microkernel is performed by interactive, machine-
assisted and machine-checked proof using a theorem prover Is-
abelle/HOL. Overall functional correctness is obtained through
a refinement proof technique, which demonstrates that the
binary of seL4 refines an abstract specification through three
layers of refinement. Consequently (under some reasonable
assumptions listed in Appendix B) the seL4 binary is fully
captured by the abstract specifications. In particular, two
important feature derived from seL4’s abstract specifications,
are that: the kernel never crashes. Another one is that: every
kernel API call always terminates and returns to user-
space. Comprehensive details of seL4’s formal verification
can be found in [13].
Another seL4 feature very relevant to our work is: correct-
ness of access control enforcement derived from functional
correctness proof of seL4. [23] and [15] introduce formal
definitions of the access control model and information flow
in seL4 at the abstract specifications. They demonstrate the
refinement proof from these modified abstract specifications
to the C implementation using Isabelle/HOL theorem prover,
which is later linked to the binary level (by the same theorem
prover). As a result, three properties are guaranteed by the
access control enforcement proof: (1) Authority Confinement,
(2) Integrity and (3) Confidentiality. Authority confinement
means that authority propagates correctly with respect to its
capability. For example, a thread with a read-only capability
for an object can only read, and not write to, that object.
Integrity implies that system state cannot be modified without
explicit authorization. For instance, a read capability should
not modify internal system state, while write capability should
only modify an object associated with that capability. Finally,
confidentiality means that an object cannot be read or inferred
without a read capability. Thus, the proof indicates that access
control in seL4, once specified at the binary level, is correctly
enforced as long as the seL4 kernel is active.
We now show how seL4’s access control enforcement
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property satisfies required RA features.
B. Deriving seL4 Access Controls from Properties
We now describe access control configuration of seL4
user-space that achieves most required properties for secure
RA, as described in section III. We examine each feature
and identify the corresponding access control configuration.
Unlike previous hybrid designs, HYDRA pushes almost all
of these required features into software, as long as the seL4
microkernel boots correctly. (A comparison with SMART and
TrustLite is in Table I.)
a) Exclusive Access to K: directly translated to an access
control configuration. Similar to previous hybrid approaches,
K can be hard-coded into the Attest at production time. Thus,
Attest needs to be configured to be accessible only to PAttest.
b) No Leaks: achieved by the separation of virtual ad-
dress space. Specifically, the virtual memory used for K-
related computation needs to be configured to be accessible
to only PAttest.
c) Immutability: achieved using combination of verifi-
able boot and runtime isolation guarantee from seL4. At
runtime, Attest must be immutable, which can be guaranteed
by restricting the access control to the executable to only
PAttest. However, this is not enough to assure immutability of
Attest executable because Attest can be modified after loaded
into RAM but before executed. Hence, a verifiable boot of
Attest is required.
d) Uninterruptability: satisfied by setting the scheduling
priority of PAttest higher than other processes since the formal
proof of seL4 scheduling mechanism guarantees that a lower
priority process cannot preempt the execution of a higher
priority process. In addition, seL4 guarantees that, once set,
the scheduling priority in seL4 cannot be increased at runtime
(but possible to decrease the priority value).
Note that this feature implies PAttest needs to be the initial
user-space process since the seL4 microkernel always assigns
the highest priority to the initial process.
e) Controlled Invocation: achieved by the isolation of
process’ execution. In particular, TCB of PAttest cannot be
accessed or manipulated by other processes.
With these features, we conclude that the access control
configuration of seL4 user-space needs to (at least) include
the following:
C1 PAttest has exclusive access to Attest; this also includes
K residing in Attest. (Recall that PAttest is the attestation
process, while Attest is the executable that actually
performs attestation.)
C2 PAttest has exclusive access to its TCB.
C3 PAttest has exclusive access to its VSpace.
Even though this access control configuration can be enforced
at the binary code level, this assumption is based on that
seL4 is loaded into RAM correctly. However, this can be
exploited by an adversary by tricking the boot-loader to
boot his malicious seL4 microkernel instead of the formally
verified version and insert a new configuration violating above
access controls. Thus, the hardware signature check of the
Fig. 2: Sequence of Operation in HYDRA
seL4 microkernel code is required at boot time. The similar
argument can also be made for PAttest’ code. As a result, ad-
ditional integrity check of PAttest’ code needs to be performed
by seL4 before executing.
C. Building Blocks
In order to achieve all security properties described above,
HYDRA requires the following four components.
a) Read-Only Memory: region primarily storing im-
mutable data (e.g. hash of public keys or signature of software)
required for secure boot of the seL4 microkernel.
b) MCU Access Control Emulation: high-assurance soft-
ware framework capable of emulating MCU access controls
to attestation key K. At present, seL4 is the only formally
verified and mathematically proven microkernel capable of this
task.
c) Attestation Algorithm: software residing in PAttest
and serving two main purposes: authenticating an attestation
request, and performing attestation on memory regions.
d) Real-Time Clock: loosely synchronized (with VRF )
real-time clock for detecting replayed, reordered and delayed
requests. If PRV does not have a clock, a secure counter
can replace a real-time clock with a sacrifice of the delayed
message detection.
D. Sequence of Operation
The sequence of operations in HYDRA, shown in Figure 2,
has three steps: boot, setup, and attestation.
a) Step 1: Boot Process: Upon a boot, PRV first ex-
ecutes a ROM-resident boot-loader. The boot-loader verifies
authenticity and integrity of the seL4 microkernel binary.
Assuming this verification succeeds, the boot-loader loads all
executables, including kernel and user-space, into RAM and
hands over control to the seL4 microkernel. Further details of
secure boot in our prototype can be found in Section V.
b) Step 2: seL4 Setup: The first task in this step is to
have the seL4 microkernel setting up the user-space and then
starting PAttest as the initial user-space process. Once the
initialization inside the kernel is over, the seL4 microkernel
gathers capabilities for all available memory-mapped locations
and assigns them to PAttest. The seL4 kernel also performs
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TABLE I: Security Properties in Hybrid RA Designs
Security Property SMART [7] TrustLite [14] HYDRA
Exclusive Access to K HW (Mod. Data Bus) SW (programmed MPU) SW (seL4)
No Leaks SW (CQUAL and Deputy) HW (CPU Exception Engine) SW (seL4)
Immutability HW (ROM) HW (ROM) and SW (programmed MPU) HW (ROM) and SW (seL4)
Uninterruptability SW (Interrupt Disabled) HW (CPU Exception Engine) SW (seL4)
Controlled Invocation HW (ROM) HW (ROM) SW (seL4)
an authenticity and integrity check of PAttest to make sure
that it has not been modified. After successful authentication,
the seL4 microkernel passes control to PAttest.
With full control over the system, PAttest starts the rest
of user-space with a lower scheduling priority and distributes
capabilities that do not violate the configuration specified
earlier. After completing configuration of memory capabilities
and starting the rest of the user-space, PAttest initializes the
network interface and waits for an attestation request.
c) Step 3: Attestation: An attestation request, sent by a
verifier, consists of 4 parameters: (1) TR reflecting PRV ’s
time when the request was generated, (2) target process p,
(3) its memory range [a, b] that needs to be attested, and (4)
cryptographic checksum CR of the entire attestation request.
Similar to SMART [7], the cryptographic checksum func-
tion used in attestation is implemented as a Message Authen-
tication Code (MAC), to ensure authenticity and integrity of
attestation protocol messages.
Upon receiving an attestation request PAttest checks
whether TR is within an acceptable range of the PRV ’s real-
time clock before performing any cryptographic operation; this
is in order to mitigate potential DoS attacks. If TR is not fresh,
PAttest ignores the request and returns to the waiting state.
Otherwise, it verifies CR. If this fails, PAttest also abandons
the request and returns to the waiting state.
Once the attestation request is authenticated, PAttest com-
putes a cryptographic checksum of the memory region [a, b]
of process p. Finally, PAttest returns the output to VRF . The
pseudo-code of this process is shown in Algorithm 1.
V. HYDRA IMPLEMENTATION
To demonstrate feasibility and assess practicality of HY-
DRA, we implement two prototypes of it on two commercially
available hardware platforms: ODROID-XU4 [11] and Sabre
Lite [5]. We focus here more on the Sabre Lite implementation
due to the lack of an seL4 compatible networking (e.g., Eth-
ernet) driver and a programmable ROM in current ODROID-
XU4 boards. Section VII presents a detailed performance
evaluation of the HYDRA implementation.
A. seL4 User-space Implementation
Our prototype is implemented on top of version 1.3 of
the seL4 microkernel [17]. The complete implementation,
including helper libraries and the networking stack, consists
of 105, 360 lines of C code (see Table II for a more detailed
Algorithm 1: Attest Pseudo-Code
Input : TR timestamp of request
p target process for attestation
a, b start/end memory region of target process
CR cryptographic checksum of request
Output: Attestation Report
1 begin
2 /* Check freshness of timestamp and verify request */
3 if ¬ CheckFreshness(TR) then
4 exit();
5 end
6 if ¬ VerifyRequest(CR, KAuth, TR‖p‖a‖b) then
7 exit();
8 end
9 /* Retrieve address space of process p */
10 Mem ← RetrieveMemory(p);
11 /* Compute attestation report */
12 MacInit(K);
13 MacUpdate(TR‖p‖a‖b);
14 for i ∈ [a, b] do
15 MacUpdate(Mem[i]);
16 end
17 out ← MacFinal();
18 return out
19 end
breakdown). The overall size of executable is 817KB whereas
the base seL4 microkernel size is 215KB. Excluding all helper
libraries, the implementation of HYDRA is just 600 lines of
C code. In the user-space, we base our C code on following
libraries: seL4utils, seL4vka and seL4vspace; these libraries
provide the abstraction of processes, memory management and
virtual space respectively. In our prototypes, PAttest is the
initial process in the user-space and receives capabilities to
all memory locations not used by seL4. Other processes in
user-space are spawned by this PAttest. We also ensure that
access control of those processes does not conflict with what
we specified in Section IV. The details of this access control
implementation are described below in this section.
The basic C function calls are implemented in muslc library.
seL4bench library is used to evaluate timing and performance
of our HYDRA implementation. For a timer driver, we rely
on its implementation in seL4platsupport. All source code for
these helper libraries can be found in [16] and these libraries
contribute around 50% of the code base in our implementation.
We use an open-source implementation of a network stack
and an Ethernet driver in the user-space [18]. We argue that
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TABLE II: Complexity of HYDRA Impl. on Our Prototype
Complexity HYDRA with HYDRA w/o HYDRA w/o seL4 Kernelnet. and libs net. stack net. and libs Only
LoC 105,360 68,490 11,938 9,142
Exec Size 817KB 721KB N/A 215KB
this component, even though not formally verified, should not
affect security objective of HYDRA as long as an IO-MMU is
used to restrict Direct Memory Access (DMA) of an Ethernet
driver. The worst case that can happen from not formally
verified network stack is symmetrical denial-of-service, which
is out of scope of HYDRA.
Fig. 3: Image Layout in Flash
B. Secure Boot Implementation
Here, we describe how we integrate an existing secure boot
feature (in Sabre Lite) with our HYDRA implementation.
a) Secure Boot in Sabre Lite: NXP provides a secure
boot feature for Sabre Lite boards, called High Assurance
Boot (HAB) [9]. HAB is implemented based on a digital
signature scheme with public- and private-keys. A private-
key is required to generate a signature of the software image
during manufacturing whereas a public-key is used by ROM
APIs for decrypting and verifying the software signature at
boot time. A public-key and a signature are attached to the
end of software image, which is pre-installed into a flash
medium during manufacturing. The digest of a public-key is
fused into a one-time programmable ROM in order to ensure
the authenticity of the public-key and the booting software
image. At boot time, the ROM boot-loader first loads the
software image into RAM and then verifies an attached public-
key by comparing it with the reference hash value in ROM.
It then authenticates the software image through the attached
signature and the verified public-key. Execution of this image
is allowed only if signature verification succeeds. Without
a private-key, an adversary cannot forge a legitimate digital
signature and thus is unable to insert and boot his malicious
image.
b) Secure Boot of HYDRA: HAB can be utilized to
ensure that the seL4 microkernel is the first program initial-
ized after the ROM boot-loader. Therefore, the entire seL4
microkernel binary code can be covered when computing the
digital signature by HAB during manufacturing. Moreover, the
seL4 microkernel needs to be assured that it gives control
of the user-space to the verified PAttest. Thus, the seL4
microkernel has to perform an integrity check of PAttest
before launching it. As a result, a hash of Attest needs to be
included in the seL4 microkernel’s binaries during production
time and be validated upon starting the initial process.
With this procedure, a chain of trust is established in the
remote attestation system in HYDRA. This implies that no
other programs, except the seL4 microkernel can be started
by the ROM boot-loader and consequently only PAttest is the
certified initial process in the user-space, which achieve the
goal of secure boot of remote attestation system. Figure 4
illustrates the secure boot of HYDRA in Sabre Lite prototype.
C. Access Control Implementation
Here we describe how the access control configuration spec-
ified in section IV is implemented in our HYDRA prototype.
Our goal is to show that in the implementation of HYDRA no
other user-space processes, except PAttest, can have any kind
of access to: (1) the binary executable code (including K),
(2) the virtual address space of PAttest, and (3) the TCB of
PAttest. To provide those access restrictions in the user-space,
we make sure that we do not assign capabilities associated to
those memory regions to other user-space processes. Recall
that PAttest as the initial process contains all capabilities to
every memory location not used by the seL4 microkernel.
And there are two ways for PAttest to issue capabilities:
dynamically transfer via endpoint with grant access right or
statically assign during bootstrapping a new process.
In our implementation, PAttest does not create any endpoint
with grant access, which disallows any capability of PAttest
to transfer to a new process after created. Thus, the only
way that capabilities can be assigned to a new process is
before that process is spawned. When creating a new process,
PAttest assigns only minimal amount of capabilities required
to operate that process, e.g. in our prototype, only the CSpace
root node and fault endpoint (used for receiving IPCs when
this thread faults) capabilities are assigned to any newly
created process. Limited to only those capabilities, any other
process cannot access the binary executable code as well as
existing virtual memory and TCB of PAttest.
Moreover, during bootstrapping the new process, PAttest
creates a new PD object serving as the root of VSpace in
the new process. This is to ensure that any new process’
virtual address space is initially empty and does not overlap
with the existing virtual memory of PAttest. Without any
further dynamic capability distribution, this guarantees that
other processes cannot access any memory page being used
by PAttest. Sample code for configuring a new process in our
prototype is provided in Appendix C.
D. Key Storage
Traditionally, in previous hybrid designs, a prover device
requires a special hardware-controlled memory location for
securely storing K and protecting it from software attacks.
However, in HYDRA, it is possible to store K in a normal
memory location (e.g. flash) due to the formally verified
access control and isolation properties of seL4. Moreover,
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Fig. 4: Secure Boot Sequence in Sabre Lite Prototype
since K is stored in a writable memory, its update can easily
happen without any secure hardware involvement. Thus, in our
prototypes, K is hard-coded at production time and stored in
the same region as Attest.
Besides K, HYDRA contains another key, KAuth, used
for verifying an authenticity of an attestation request. KAuth
can be a separate key and pre-stored next to K during a
production time; or, KAuth can be derived from K through
a key derivation function (KDF) at runtime as well.
E. Timestamp Generation
Recall (Section IV) that a timestamp generated by a loosely
synchronous real-time clock is required for ensuring freshness
of attestation requests. There is currently no implementa-
tion of drivers for real-time clock in seL4. We generate a
pseudo-timestamp by a counter, whose driver is provided by
seL4platsupport, and a timestamp of the first validated request,
as follows: When a device first wakes up and securely start
PAttest. PAttest promptly loads a timestamp, Tsave, that was
previously saved in a separated location of flash medium
before the last reset. When the first attestation request arrives,
PAttest checks its attached timestamp, Tfirst, whether it is
greater than Tsave and proceeds to V erifyRequest if that
is the case. After the assurance of the validated request,
PAttest keeps track of Tfirst and start a counter. At any
time afterwards, a timestamp can be constructed by combining
the current counter value with Tfirst. In addition, PAttest
periodically generates and saves this timestamp value into flash
medium for the next reboot’s usage.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we (informally) demonstrate how HYDRA
satisfies the minimal set of requirements to realize secure
RA (described in Section III). The following are key features
ensured in the design and implementation of HYDRA:
(1) the seL4 microkernel is the first executable that is
loaded in a HYDRA-based system upon boot/initialization.
Correctness of this step is guaranteed by a ROM integrity
check at boot time, e.g., HAB in the Sabre Lite case.
(2) The attestation process (PAttest ) 2 is the first user-
space process that is loaded into memory and is bootstrapped
2PAttest is different from Attest per Figure 3. PAttest is what is called
“initial process” in Figure 3 and it contains Attest executable as a component.
by seL4. This is also guaranteed using a software integrity
check step performed by seL4 before spawning the initial
process.
(3) PAttest then starts with the highest scheduling priority
and never decreases its own priority value. This can be
guaranteed by ensuring the code of PAttest does not contain
any system calls to decrease its priority.
(4) Any other subsequent process that is loaded on top of
the seL4 microkernel is spawned by PAttest and does not
receive the highest scheduling priority. This can be ensured by
inspecting the PAttest code and ensuring that all invocations
of other processes are with a lower priority value. Once a
process is loaded with a certain priority, seL4 prevents it
from increasing its priority value; this is formally verified and
guaranteed in the seL4 implementation.
(5) The software executable and K can only be mapped into
the address space of PAttest. This is guaranteed by ensuring
that in the PAttest code no other process on initialization
(performed in PAttest ) receives the capabilities to access said
memory ranges.
(6) Virtual memory used by PAttest cannot be used by any
other process; this includes any memory used for any compu-
tation touching the key, or related to other values computed
using the key. This is formally verified and guaranteed in the
seL4 implementation.
(7) Other processes cannot control or infer execution of
PAttest (protected by exclusive capability to TCB’s PAttest).
(8) Access control properties, i.e., authority confinement,
integrity and confidentiality, in seL4’s binary are
mathematically guaranteed by its formal verification.
Given the above features, the security properties in Section
III are satisfied because:
Exclusive Access to K: (5), (6) and (8) guarantee that only
PAttest can have access to K.
No Leaks: (6) and (8) ensures that intermediate values
created by key-related computation inside PAttest cannot be
leaked to or learned by other processes.
Immutability: (1) and (2) implies that HYDRA is initial-
ized into the correct expected known initial states and that the
correct binary executable is securely loaded into RAM. (5)
also prevents other processes from modifying that executable.
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(a) MAC Implementations (b) Memory Mapping in seL4 (c) MacMem and RetrieveMem
(d) MacMem vs Mem Size (e) MacMem vs Num Processes
Fig. 5: Evaluation of HYDRA in SabreLite prototype
Uninterruptability: (3) and (4) guarantees that other pro-
cesses, always having a lower priority value compared to
PAttest, cannot interrupt the execution of PAttest.
Controlled Invocation: (7) ensures that the execution of
PAttest cannot be manipulated by other applications.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We present here performance evaluation of HYDRA using
the Sabre Lite prototype. (Results of HYDRA on ODROID-
XU4 are in Appendix A). We conduct experiments to assess
speed of, and overhead involved in, performing attestation
using different types of keyed Message Authentication Code
(MAC) functions, on various numbers of user-space processes
and sizes of memory regions to be attested. We obtain the
fastest performance using the Speck MAC; HYDRA can attest
10MB in less than 500msec in that case.
a) Breakdown of Attestation Runtime: Recall from Sec-
tion IV, that the attestation algorithm (Algorithm 1) is com-
posed of three operations. V erifyRequest (lines 3 to 9) is
responsible for verifying an attestation request and whether
it has been recently generated by an authorized verifier.
RetrieveMem (line 11) maps memory regions from a target
process to PAttest’s address space and returns a pointer to
the mapped memory. MacMem (lines 13 to 20) computes a
cryptographic checksum (using K) on the memory regions.
As shown in Table III, the runtime of MacMem contributes
the highest amount of the overall Attest runtime: 84% of total
time for attesting 1MB of memory and 90% for attesting 10
KB of memory on Sabre Lite; whereas RetrieveMem and
V erifyRequest together require less than 20% of the overall
time.
b) Performance of RetrieveMem in seL4: Another
important factor affecting the performance of HYDRA is the
runtime of RetrieveMem: the time PAttest takes to map the
attested memory regions to its own virtual address space. As
expected, Figure 5b illustrates the memory mapping runtime
in seL4 is linear in terms of mapped memory size. In addition,
we compare the runtime of RetrieveMem and MacMem on
larger memory sizes. Figure 5c illustrates that the runtime ratio
of RetrieveMem to various implementations of MacMem
is always less than 20%. This confirms that retrieving memory
and mapping it to the address space account for only a small
fraction of the total attestation time in HYDRA. This illustrates
that whatever overhead seL4 introduces when enforcing ac-
cess control on memory is not significant and does not render
HYDRA impractical.
c) Performance of MacMem in seL4: Since MacMem
is the biggest contributor to the runtime of our implemen-
tations, we explore various types of (keyed) cryptographic
checksums and their performance on top of seL4. We compare
the performance of five different MAC functions, namely,
CBC-AES [25], HMAC-SHA-256 [3], Simon and Speck [20],
and BLAKE2S [21], on 1MB of data in the user-space of
seL4. The performance results in Figure 5a illustrate that the
runtime of MAC based on Speck-64-128 3 and BLAKE2S in
seL4 are similar; and they are at least 33% faster than other
MAC functions when running on Sabre Lite.
3Speck with 64-bit block size and 128-bit key size
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TABLE III: Performance Breakdown of Algorithm 1 on I.MX-
SL @ 1GHz
Operations
1 MB of Memory 10 KB of Memory
Time in cycle Proportion Time in cycle Proportion
V erifyRequest 3,992 <0.01% 3,961 0.75%
RetrieveMem 8,731,858 15.11% 47,136 8.93%
MacMem 49,021,846 84.89% 476,857 90.32%
Overall 57,757,696 100% 527,954 100%
d) Performance of MacMem vs Memory Sizes: Another
factor that affects MacMem’s performance is the size of
memory regions to be attested. We experiment by creating
another process in the user-space and perform attestation on
various sizes (ranging from 1MB to 10MB) of memory regions
inside that process. As expected, the results of this experiment,
illustrated in Figure 5d, indicate that MacMem performance
is linear as a function of the attested memory sizes. This
experiment also illustrates feasibility of performing attestation
of 10MB of memory on top of seL4 in HYDRA using a
Speck-based MAC in less than half a second.
e) Performance on MacMem vs Numbers of Processes:
This experiment answers the following question: How would
an increase in number of processes affect the performance
of HYDRA? To answer it, we have the initial process spawn
additional user-space processes (from 2 to 20 extra processes)
and, then, perform MacMem on 100 KB memory data in one
of those processes. To ensure fair scheduling of every process,
we set priority of all processes (including the initial process)
to the maximum priority. The result from Figure 5e indicates
that the performance of MacMem is reasonably linear as a
function of the number of processes on Sabre Lite.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents the first hybrid Remote Attestation
design, HYDRA, that leverages the formally verified seL4
microkernel to instantiate memory and process isolation, and
enforce access control to memory and other resources; such
isolation and access control have been ensured through hard-
ware in previous designs. We implement HYDRA on two com-
modity hardware platforms and demonstrate feasibility and
practicality of hybrid RA schemes that significantly improve
security in contemporary embedded and cyber-physical sys-
tems, and that can work on commodity hardware and require
no modification to it while providing security guarantees that
can be assured using automated formal methods.
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Fig. 6: Evaluation of HYDRA in ODROID-XU4 prototype
APPENDIX A
HYDRA’S PERFORMANCE IN ODROID-XU4
We also evaluate performance of HYDRA in ODROID-XU4
@ 2.1 GHz. Despite not having an Ethernet driver, we evaluate
the core component of HYDRA: MacMem. Unlike the results
in Section VII, BLAKE2S-based MAC achieves the fastest
performance for attesting 10MB on ODROID-XU4 platform.
a) MAC Performance in Linux vs in seL4: Figure 6a
illustrates the performance comparison of various keyed MAC
functions on ODROID-XU4 hardware platform when running
on Ubuntu 15.10 and seL4. The result emphasizes the feasi-
bility of RA in seL4 since the runtime of seL4-based RA can
be as fast as that of RA running on top of widely prominent
Linux operating system.
b) MAC Performance on ODROIX-XU4: The result in
Section VII and the one from above demonstrate that Speck-
and BLAKE2S-based MACs have the fastest attestation run-
time in seL4. We conduct additional experiments on those two
MAC functions in ODROID-XU4 platform. Figure 6b asserts
the linear relationship between number of processes and
MacMem runtime. In addition, the MAC runtime, shown in
Figure 6c, is also linear in memory sizes to be attested. Lastly,
runtime of the BLAKE2S-based MAC function achieves less
than 200 milliseconds for attesting 10MB of memory regions
in ODROID-XU4
APPENDIX B
seL4’S PROOF ASSUMPTIONS
seL4’s functional correctness proof is based on the follow-
ing assumptions:
• Assembly - it assumes the correctness of ARM assembly
code mainly for entry to and exit from the kernel and
direct hardware accesses.
• Hardware - it assumes hardware operates according to
its specification and has not been tampered with.
• Hardware Management - it assumes the correctness
of the underlying hardware management, including a
translation look-aside buffer (TLB) and cache-flushing
operations.
• Boot Code - it assumes the correctness of code that boots
the seL4 microkernel into memory.
• Direct Memory Access (DMA) - it assumes DMA is
disabled or trusted.
• Side-channels - it assumes there is no timing side-
channels.
APPENDIX C
SAMPLE CODE FOR STARTING NEW PROCESS
In our implementation, PAttest creates a new empty process
with the default configuration below:
int sel4utils_configure_process_custom(sel4utils_process_t *
process, vka_t *vka, vspace_t *spawner_vspace,
sel4utils_process_config_t config)
{
int error;
sel4utils_alloc_data_t * data = NULL;
memset(process, 0, sizeof(sel4utils_process_t));
seL4_CapData_t cspace_root_data = seL4_CapData_Guard_new(0,
seL4_WordBits - config.one_level_cspace_size_bits);
/* create a page directory */
process->own_vspace = config.create_vspace;
error = vka_alloc_vspace_root(vka, &process->pd);
if (error) {
goto error;
}
/* assign an asid pool */
if (assign_asid_pool(config.asid_pool, process->pd.cptr) !=
seL4_NoError) {
goto error;
}
/* create a cspace and copy its cap to the new process */
process->own_cspace = config.create_cspace;
if (create_cspace(vka, config.one_level_cspace_size_bits,
process, cspace_root_data) != 0) {
goto error;
}
/* create a fault endpoint and copy its cap to the new
process */
if (create_fault_endpoint(vka, process) != 0) {
goto error;
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}/* create a vspace */
sel4utils_get_vspace(spawner_vspace, &process->vspace, &
process->data, vka, process->pd.cptr,
sel4utils_allocated_object, (void *) process);
/* finally elf load */
process->entry_point = sel4utils_elf_load(&process->vspace,
spawner_vspace, vka, vka, config.image_name);
if (process->entry_point == NULL) {
goto error;
}
/* create the thread */
error = sel4utils_configure_thread(vka, spawner_vspace, &
process->vspace, SEL4UTILS_ENDPOINT_SLOT, config.
priority, process->cspace.cptr, cspace_root_data, &
process->thread);
if (error) {
goto error;
}
return 0;
error:
/* clean up */
...
return -1;
}
int sel4utils_configure_thread_config(vka_t *vka, vspace_t *
parent, vspace_t *alloc, sel4utils_thread_config_t config,
sel4utils_thread_t *res)
{
memset(res, 0, sizeof(sel4utils_thread_t));
int error = vka_alloc_tcb(vka, &res->tcb);
if (error == -1) {
sel4utils_clean_up_thread(vka, alloc, res);
return -1;
}
res->ipc_buffer_addr = (seL4_Word) vspace_new_ipc_buffer(
alloc, &res->ipc_buffer);
if (res->ipc_buffer_addr == 0) {
return -1;
}
if (write_ipc_buffer_user_data(vka, parent, res->ipc_buffer
, res->ipc_buffer_addr)) {
return -1;
}
seL4_CapData_t null_cap_data = {{0}};
error = seL4_TCB_Configure(res->tcb.cptr, config.
fault_endpoint, config.priority, config.cspace, config
.cspace_root_data, vspace_get_root(alloc),
null_cap_data, res->ipc_buffer_addr, res->ipc_buffer);
if (error != seL4_NoError) {
sel4utils_clean_up_thread(vka, alloc, res);
return -1;
}
res->stack_top = vspace_new_stack(alloc);
if (res->stack_top == NULL) {
sel4utils_clean_up_thread(vka, alloc, res);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
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